UPSC Mathematics Optional · Paper II · LPP, Duality, Transportation & Game Theory
Maximize (or minimize) \(Z=\mathbf{c}^T\mathbf{x}\) subject to \(A\mathbf{x}\le\mathbf{b}\) (or \(=\), \(\ge\)), \(\mathbf{x}\ge\mathbf{0}\).
Standard form (for Simplex): \(A\mathbf{x}=\mathbf{b}\), \(\mathbf{x}\ge\mathbf{0}\), \(\mathbf{b}\ge\mathbf{0}\).
Convert: \(\le\) → add slack variable; \(\ge\) → subtract surplus + add artificial; \(=\) → add artificial.
Big-M method: Add artificial variables \(a_i\) with coefficient \(M\) (very large) in objective. If optimal solution has \(a_i>0\) → infeasible LPP.
Two-phase method:
Phase I: Minimize \(\sum a_i\) s.t. constraints. If min \(>0\) → infeasible.
Phase II: Use phase I optimal BFS as starting point; optimize original objective.
Primal: Max \(\mathbf{c}^T\mathbf{x}\), s.t. \(A\mathbf{x}\le\mathbf{b}\), \(\mathbf{x}\ge\mathbf{0}\).
Dual: Min \(\mathbf{b}^T\mathbf{y}\), s.t. \(A^T\mathbf{y}\ge\mathbf{c}\), \(\mathbf{y}\ge\mathbf{0}\).
Weak: Any primal feasible \(\mathbf{x}\) and dual feasible \(\mathbf{y}\): \(\mathbf{c}^T\mathbf{x}\le\mathbf{b}^T\mathbf{y}\).
Strong: If primal has optimal \(\mathbf{x}^*\) and dual has optimal \(\mathbf{y}^*\): \(\mathbf{c}^T\mathbf{x}^*=\mathbf{b}^T\mathbf{y}^*\).
Complementary Slackness: At optimality: \(y_i(b_i-A_i\mathbf{x})=0\) and \(x_j(A^T_j\mathbf{y}-c_j)=0\).
Minimize \(\sum_{i,j}c_{ij}x_{ij}\) s.t. \(\sum_j x_{ij}=a_i\) (supply), \(\sum_i x_{ij}=b_j\) (demand), \(x_{ij}\ge 0\).
Balanced: \(\sum a_i=\sum b_j\). If not balanced, add dummy row/column with 0 cost.
A BFS has \(m+n-1\) allocations (non-degenerate).
Assign \(u_i+v_j=c_{ij}\) for basic cells (set \(u_1=0\)). Compute \(d_{ij}=c_{ij}-u_i-v_j\) for non-basic cells.
Optimal iff all \(d_{ij}\ge 0\). If any \(d_{ij}<0\): enter that cell, form a loop, reallocate \(\theta\) (min of alternating cells with \(-\theta\)).
Maximization: convert to minimization by subtracting all entries from max element.
Payoff matrix \(A\) (player I's gain = player II's loss). Player I: max; Player II: min.
Saddle point: \(a_{ij}^*\) is simultaneously row-max of its row and col-min of its column. Value of game \(v=a_{ij}^*\).
Saddle point exists iff \(\max_i\min_j a_{ij}=\min_j\max_i a_{ij}\) (minimax = maximin).
If no saddle point: use mixed strategies \(\mathbf{p}=(p_1,\ldots,p_m)\) for player I, \(\mathbf{q}=(q_1,\ldots,q_n)\) for II.
Expected payoff \(E=\mathbf{p}^TA\mathbf{q}\). Player I maximizes, II minimizes.
For 2×2 matrix \(\begin{pmatrix}a&b\\c&d\end{pmatrix}\):
\(p_1=\dfrac{d-c}{a+d-b-c}\), \(p_2=1-p_1\). \(v=\dfrac{ad-bc}{a+d-b-c}\).
Dominance: If row \(i\) dominates row \(j\) (all entries \(\ge\)), player II will never use col \(j\) → reduce matrix.
Reduction to LPP: Player I: max \(v\) s.t. \(A^T\mathbf{p}\ge v\mathbf{1}\), \(\sum p_i=1\), \(\mathbf{p}\ge\mathbf{0}\).